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ABSTRACT
The role of emotions in moral behaviors is emphasized by many neuroscientists and philoso-
phers. From psychological point of view, solving moral dilemmas is impossible in isolation from 
cognitive-emotional processes related to the self. This study aimed to test self-related factors ex-
plaining discrepancies in the judgement of hostility and sadness experienced by someone else’s vic-
tim and the judge’s own victim, suffering from severe and trifling offences. The research was con-
ducted in both experimental and correlational paradigms, with response surface analysis (RSA) as 
a key method of data analysis. Total number of participants was 171. The questionnaires used were: 
The Self-Motive Items (SMI), Self-Esteem Scale (SES), Ten Items Personality Inventory (TIPI-PL) 
and The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form. According to the results, self-
esteem is a predictor of (in)congruence of the levels of hostility attributed to victims suffering from 
severe offenses, while the motives of self-enhancement and self-assessment predict particular pat-
terns of (mis)matches in the levels of hostility attributed to victims suffering from trifling offenses. 
Discussion of the findings deals, inter alia, with the role of self-perspective in effective recognition 
of other people’s emotional states.
Keywords: hostility; victim; self-enhancement; self-esteem; response surface analysis
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INTRODUCTION
Assessing what is wrong and what is bad is a subject of morality. This short 
and simple statement refers to a philosophical struggle of unspeakable importance 
for foundations of human’s functioning in social context. Interpretation of morali-
ty and values as stable and universal or changeable and individual has been chang-
ing accordingly to breakthrough social events (e.g. French or Russian revolution 
or sexual revolution in the USA). Commonly known Kantian system of moral 
decision making via categorical imperatives presents duty and respect for law as 
the only rightful motivations of moral behavior (Kant, 2002). Although law obe-
dience may be considered as an affective force, i.e. a moral feeling of pleasure or 
unpleasure (Senderowicz, 2011), Kant rejects significance of emotions like empa-
thy, compassion and shame in moral decision making and comes out with a pro-
posal that metaphysical capacity for understanding what is morally good or wrong 
is present within each and every person, regardless of educational, social or any 
other distinguishing statuses (Thorpe, 2006). On the other hand, Hume’s empirical 
theory of mind locates the source of moral thinking in passions, i.e. emotions, giv-
ing them priority over reason (Hume, 2001). This theoretical proposition remains 
convincing in the light of broad neuroscience research on morality, indicating 
that moral dilemmas are indeed not only subjects of cognitive, but also emotional 
processes (Killen, Smetana, 2008). For example, findings of the studies investi-
gating the activity of particular brain structures and endocrine system (especially 
oxytocin and vasopressin) suggest that morality is in fact a generalization of the 
sense of belonging and care towards one’s offspring (Churchland, 2018). In this 
approach, the original bound between parents and children is connected with the 
goal of protecting the offspring from death and suffering. In a process of socializa-
tion, this hormonal-neurological code of emotional reaction towards offspring is 
generalizing and transforming into moral standards of behavior towards unrelated 
individuals (Churchland, 2018). What is more, the intuition of the significance of 
emotions in morality can be observed even in the five-year-old children (Dano-
vitch, Keil, 2008) and emotional reaction to crime seems to appear in different 
countries (Matsumoto, Hwang, 2015). For the above reasons, emotions may be 
considered as an unconscious, basic language of morality; a compass transmitting 
the hurt of others into our own emotional reactions, like empathy and compassion 
on the one hand, and shame and guilt (as forms of self-punishment for not obeying 
social norms) on the other (Elsenbroich, Gilbert, 2014).
Emotions in morality (i.e. moral emotions) can be divided into four groups: 
emotions concerning others, self-conscious emotions, emotions related to prais-
ing others and emotions related to suffering of the others (Vélez García, Ostrosky-
Solís, 2006). An example of moral emotion related to others is empathy, however, 
it is interesting not only what people feel in reaction to someone else’s suffering, 
SELF-RELATED FACTORS EXPLAINING DOUBLE STANDARDS… 107
but also what predictions they have of the feelings of a sufferer. This issue hap-
pens to be important in criminal psychology since it was proved that a victim 
whose emotional reactions are inadequate to the severity of the offense may be 
the subject of less empathy (Rose, Nadler, Clark, 2006). What factors affect the 
judgment of the victim’s feelings? An important factor is probably the mentioned 
severity of the offense, but its status is not entirely clear. At first glance, it seems 
that the distinction between serious crime (e.g. murder, personal injury, violation 
of freedom) and much less socially harmful misdemeanor (e.g. little theft, defa-
mation) is not a moral dilemma. For example, we are likely to expect the victim 
struggling with a serious, long-term health consequence of the car crash to experi-
ence stronger negative emotions as compared to the victim of a car steal. Howev-
er, what happens with the assessment of emotions felt by the victim of an offense 
if the assessor and the perpetrator are the same person?
The question raised above touches strictly the sphere of the self, described by 
William James (1890) as the only and unavoidable mediator and controller in the 
person’s interactions with the world. The involvement of the self in the situation 
of the offense in the role of the perpetrator may significantly affect the objectiv-
ity of judgement, e.g. due to a person’s tendency to keep positive self-view by 
lowering the expected negative emotional consequences in one’s own victim. It 
appears that at least the two of four cardinal self-motives (i.e. motivational proc-
esses engaged in searching for and processing self-related information – Gregg, 
Heepper, Sedikides, 2011) may be responsible for the level of acceptance or re-
jection of negative information about being the cause of other people’s suffering. 
One of them, i.e. the motive of self-enhancement, denotes the urge to see one-
self positively, either by self-promotion (i.e. playing up positive attributes) or by 
self-protection (i.e. playing down negative attributes) (Alicke, Sedikides, 2009). 
However, it is not obvious what kinds of behavior are considered as useful in the 
processes of self-promotion or self-protection in particular individuals. It cannot 
be excluded that, e.g. due to immoral tendencies, some people may self-enhance 
via unethical deeds. In turn, the motive of self-assessment denotes the desire to 
know the truth about oneself, which involves intentional search for objective facts 
instead of a biased search for preferred information (Trope, 1986). The problem 
is that despite such noble motivation, people high in self-assessment are not with-
out the risk of overestimation or underestimation when evaluating their own be-
haviors. Both self-enhancement and self-assessment play their specific roles in 
the process of building global self-esteem (Sedikides, Gaertner, Cai, 2015), de-
fined as a relatively stable positive/negative attitude towards the self (Rosenberg, 
1965). Just as importantly, self-esteem and self-enhancement are significant indi-
cators of satisfaction with the self and may also predict higher well-being (Neiss, 
Sedikides, Stevenson, 2002; O’Mara, Gaertner, Sedikides, Zhou, Liu, 2012). On 
the contrary, hurting other people is likely to affect well-being of the perpetra-
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tor in a negative direction, which makes the self-processes described above even 
more relevant when considering such type of immoral behavior. The same applies 
to at least two of the Big Five personality traits (McCrae, Costa, 2003), as these 
basic tendencies to think, feel and act have proved to be correlated with the val-
ues preferred by the person (Athota, Budhwar, Malik, 2019). Agreeableness, by 
definition strongly associated with empathy (McCrae, Costa, 2003), should both 
protect against denying that one is the perpetrator of someone else’s suffering and 
increase one’s emotional identification with the victim. Neuroticism (i.e. the op-
position of emotional stability – McCrae, Costa, 2003) not only provides a first-
hand extensive experience in struggling with emotional states like sadness, anger, 
hostility and depression, but as a consequence may also strengthen the identifica-
tion with the victim or, on the contrary, block the culprit’s overwhelming aware-
ness of being the cause of someone else’s suffering. For the purposes of this study, 
emotions experienced by the victim were limited to sadness and hostility, as they 
range from emotional pain to aggression, i.e. the two main areas of emotional self-
regulation with respect to negative emotionality (Caprara, Di Giunta, Eisenberg, 
Gerbino, Pastorelli, Tramontano, 2008). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
There were three research questions in this study, of which the first two were 
investigated in experimental design:
– Question 1 (Q1): Does the severity of the offense (independent variable IV: 
“Offense”, conditions: “Severe” x “Trifling”) affect the judgment of the vic-
tim’s sadness/hostility (dependent variables DVs)?
• Hypothesis 1 (H1): People will judge higher sadness/hostility of the vic-
tim of severe offense, as compared to the victim of trifling offense.
– Question 2 (Q2): Does the identity of the perpetrator (IV: “Identity”, condi-
tions: “My victim” x “Not My Victim”) affect the judgment of the victim’s 
sadness/hostility (DVs)?
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): People will judge lower sadness/hostility of their 
own victim, as compared to someone else’s victim (this hypothesis may 
be justified by the universality and ubiquity of the self-enhancement 
motive).
– Question 3 (Q3): How is the (in)congruence between one’s judgments 
of emotional consequences (sadness/hostility) in one’s own victim and 
someone else’s victim related to the selected aspects of one’s self (i.e. 
self-enhancement/self-assessment/ self-esteem/agreeableness/emotional 
stability)?
Due to the ambiguous theoretical premises summarized in the introduction 
section, Q3 was exploratory and investigated in correlational design.
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METHOD
This study was run online, distributed via Facebook groups gathering students 
from various Polish universities. Participants could voluntarily fill in the batteries 
of tests on Google Forms, with the right to drop out at any convenient moment. 
General information about the aim of the study (i.e. “investigation of moral atti-
tudes”), anonymity and data protection were provided as well. Subjects did not 
receive any reward for their participation in this study. Total number of partici-
pants was 171, of which 144 were females and 27 males. Participants belonged 
to two separable experimental groups, accordingly to the conditions of the inde-
pendent variable “Offense”: “Severe” group [N = 94 (79 female), Mage = 22.41, 
SDage = 3.32) and “Trifling” group [N = 77 (65 female), Mage = 22.79, SDage = 2.99]. 
These sample sizes were dictated by the power analyses (Faul, Erdfelder, Buch-
ner, Lang, 2009): the number of 77 participants was enough to provide the rec-
ommended .80 power to detect medium effects (R2 = .15) in the response surface 
analysis RSA, a statistical method used in order to answer Q3. RSA is “an ap-
proach designed to answer questions about how (mis)matching predictors relate to 
outcomes while avoiding many of the statistical limitations of alternative, often-
used approaches” (Barranti, Carlson Cote, 2017, p. 465; see also: Miciuk, Dubas-
Miciuk, in press). Many studies have proved the superiority of RSA over e.g. 
moderated regression, difference scores, residuals, and the truth and bias model 
(Barranti, Carlson, Cote, 2017; Humberg, Nestler, Back, 2019). The sample sizes 
established in this way were also sufficient to provide normal distributions for the 
sake of t-test for equality of means (for independent and dependent samples), used 
to answer Q1 and Q2. Below we describe the scales and tasks included in the bat-
teries of tests used in this study. Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients 
for all measurements in current study are presented in Table 2.
There were two experimental groups (independent samples), each with re-
peated measurement (dependent samples). This is because judgements of the vic-
tim’s sadness and hostility both “Offence” conditions (“Severe”/“Trifling”) were 
assessed with two purpose-designed tasks presented one after the other (the case 
of “Not My Victim” and the case of “My Victim”). Each task consisted of two ele-
ments: (1) the short story serving as a manipulation setting the experimental con-
ditions of the two independent variables, i.e. severity of the offense and the iden-
tity of the perpetrator (English translation of all four short-stories are presented in 
table 1) and (2) the question: “How do you think? To what extent the victim expe-
riences (because of the described offense) the emotional states listed below?”, fol-
lowed by the selected items from the PANAS-X, allowing the participant to assess 
the victim’s sadness and hostility. The PANAS-X is The Positive and Negative Af-
fect Schedule – Expanded Form by David Watson and Lee Anna Clark (1994) in 
Polish adaptation by Małgorzata Fajkowska and Magdalena Marszał-Wiśniewska 
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(2009). This inventory consists of sixty words and phrases describing emotional 
states to be assessed on a Likert scale and includes subscales measuring sadness 
and hostility. Cronbach’s α coefficients for sadness varied from .87 to .83 for the 
original version and from .86 to .88 for Polish adaptation; as regards hostility, the 
coefficients were .82–.83 and .76–.84, respectively. However, for the purposes of 
this study, only three items with the highest factor loadings were taken from each 
of these two subscales. 
Table 1. Short stories used as manipulations in the experiment




“Imagine the following situation…”
(The case of NOT 
MY victim)
“You found the following information 
in the media: as a result of someone’s 
irresponsible play with firecrackers, 
a person passing nearby have lost 
vision irreversibly”.
“A resident of Warsaw stole several 
bars from a local store. The cashier 
discovers this by doing a review of 
the shelves at the end of the day”.
(The case of MY 
victim)
“You were driving a car under 
influence of alcohol and caused an 
accident because of which a young 
person has to move on a wheelchair 
for the rest of life”.
“You secretly took out a few rolls 
from a self-service bakery. Sometime 
later, the baker notices this, when 
preparing another batch of take-out 
sandwiches”.
Note: The equivalence of the short-stories (i.e. “the case of my victim” and “the case of not my vic-
tim”) for a given type of crime (i.e. severe and trifling) was confirmed by five independent compe-
tent judges (all having M.A. in psychology).
Source: Authors’ own study.
Self-enhancement and self-assessment motives were measured by the corre-
sponding subscales of The Self-Motive Items (SMI) by Aiden Gregg, Erica Hep-
per, and Constantine Sedikides (2011) in Polish adaptation by Miciuk and Oleś 
(2018). Each motive was measured on a 7-point response scale (1: “totally disa-
gree” – 7: “totally agree”) by the two dedicated items about what a person likes 
to hear and wants do discover about himself/herself (e.g. “In general, I LIKE to 
hear the TRUTH about me as a person”). The SMI is a valid, short and elegant 
measure of individual differences in self-motives. Spearman-Brown split-half re-
liability coefficients varied from .63 to .76 (self-enhancement) and from .67 to .84 
(self-assessment) for the original version and .67–.84 and .61–.75, respectively for 
Polish adaptation.
Self-esteem was measured by the Self-Esteem Scale SES (Rosenberg, 1965) 
in Polish adaptation by Mariola Łaguna, Kinga Lachowicz-Tabaczek, and Irena 
Dzwonkowska (2007), consisting of 10 items measuring self-esteem as a stable 
personality characteristic (e.g. “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”). Re-
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spondent has to assess each item on a 4-point response scale (“strongly agree”, 
“agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”). Cronbach’s α coefficient varied from 
.77 to -.88 for the original version and  from .81 to -.83 for Polish adaptation.
Agreeableness and emotional stability were measured by the corresponding 
2-item subscales of the brief measure of the Big Five personality traits (Costa, Mc-
Crae, 2003), i.e. the Ten Items Personality Inventory TIPI (Gosling, Rentfrow, 
Swann, 2003) in Polish adaptation by Agnieszka Sorokowska, Anita Zbieg, and Pi-
otr Sorokowski (2014). Exemplary item is “I see myself as sympathetic, warm” and 
the response scale varies from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Reli-
ability coefficients for the original version were: .40 (agreeableness) and .83 (emo-
tional stability), while for Polish adaptation they were .54 and .73, respectively. 
The order in which the measures were presented to the participants was as 
follows: SMI, SES, Task 1: “The case of NOT MY victim” (condition: “Severe” 
or “Trifling” offense), TIPI(PL), Task 2: “The case of MY victim” (condition: the 
same as in Task 1). Response surface analyses were calculated with the use of R 
RSA package (Schönbrodt, 2018) and R syntax (Barranti, Carlson, Cote, 2017 – 
supplemental materials).
RESULTS
Despite disproportions in the number of females and males in both experi-
mental groups, men and women did not differ significantly in the measured varia-
bles, with the only exception of emotional stability (t(92) = -1.74, p < .05), signifi-
cantly higher in men (M = 7.87, SD = 4.33) than in women (M = 6.18; SD = 3.27) 
from the “Severe Offense” condition. This result is in line with a broad research 
on neuroticism, often showing higher neuroticism in women than in men (Mc-
Crae, Costa, 2003; Sorokowska, Zbieg, Sorokowski, 2014).
According to the statistics presented in Table 2, the victim’s sadness was 
judged higher in “Severe” offence condition, as compared to “Trifling” offence 
condition. However, there were no significant differences between the judgements 
of the victim’s hostility in “Severe” and “Trifling” offence conditions. What is 
more, in the experimental group considering “Severe” offense, hostility and sad-
ness were judged higher in “My victim” condition, as compared to “Not my vic-
tim” condition. However, results were less consistent in the experimental group 
considering “Trifling” offense: the sadness of “My victim” was judged lower than 
the sadness of “Not my victim”, but there was also a statistical tendency that the 
hostility of “My victim” was judged higher than the hostility of “Not my victim”.
Response surface analysis (RSA) was used to test (for “Severe” and “Tri-
fling” offenses separately) how is the (in)convergence of one’s judgements of 
emotional consequences (i.e. sadness/hostility) in one’s own victim and in some-
one else’s victim related to such aspects of one’s self as: self-enhancement mo-
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Table 2. Means, standards deviations, t-tests, effect sizes and reliability coefficients for all measurements
Measurements




























































r.c. – reliability coefficient: Cronbach’s α coefficient for hostility and sadness and Spearman-Brown 
split-half coefficient for the rest of measurements; ES – effect size coefficient: Hedges’s g for de-
pendent samples and Cohen’s d for independent samples; tds – t-test for equality of means for de-
pendent samples; tis – t-test for equality of means for independent samples; M – mean; SD – standard 
deviation; df – degrees of freedom;
***p < .001, *p < .05, Ʈp < .06
Source: Authors’ own study.
tive, self-assessment motive, self-esteem, agreeableness and emotional stability. 
(Mis)matches in the judgements of sadness had no significant relationships with 
the above-mentioned aspects of the self, both in “Severe” and “Trifling” offense 
conditions. As regards (mis)matches in the judgements of hostility and their re-
lations to the self, three models proved to be relevant. In “Trifling” offense con-
dition, different patterns of (in)congruence between the judgements of hostility 
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were predicted by self-enhancement (R2 = .19, p < .05) and self-assessment (R2 
= .28, p < .001). Visualizations of these results are presented in Figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. As regards “Severe” offense condition, different patterns of (in)con-
gruence between the judgements of hostility were predicted by self-esteem (R2 = 
.13, p < .05). The visualization of this finding is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 1. Response surface for (dis)similarities in the judgements of the victim’s hostility in trifling 
offense condition – relationships with self-enhancement. The polynomial coefficients were as fol-
lows: b0 = 5.34, 95% confidence interval (CI) [4.94, 5.74]; b1 = .42, 95% CI [-.02, .86]; b2 = -1.01, 
95% CI [-1.60, -.42]; b3 = .07, 95% CI [-.18, .31]; b4 = .07, 95% CI [-.40, .55]; b5 = -.23 [-.62, .15].
Source: Authors’ own study.
Figures 1–3 present three different response surfaces drawn in analogous co-
ordinate systems. Vertical (X) axis represents particular self-related variable (e.g. 
self-enhancement). Both judgements of the victims’ hostility (horizontal axes X: 
“My Victim” and horizontal axis Y: “Not My Victim”) are centered on the mid-
point (0) of the scales. Thick black line from point (X = -2, Y = -2, Z = ...) to point 
(X = 2, Y = 2, Z = ...) is the line of congruence, i.e. it reflects observations where 
value of X and value of Y perfectly match at all scale levels. Thick black line from 
point (X = 2, Y = -2, Z = ...) to point (X = -2, Y = 2, Z = ...) is the line of incongru-
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ence, i.e. the line representing observations where values of X and Y are opposite 
(Barranti, Carlson, Cote, 2017; Miciuk, Dubas-Miciuk, in press).
As we can see in Figure 1 (“Trifling” offense), respondents who attributed 
high hostility to their own victim and low hostility to someone else’s victim had 
strong self-enhancement motive (a3 = 1.42; 95% confidence interval [CI] = [.47, 
2.38]). In turn, respondents who attributed higher hostility to both victims were 
characterized by medium levels of self-enhancement, while respondents who at-
tributed lower hostility of both victims were characterized by higher levels of self-
enhancement (a1 = -.59; 95% [CI] = [-1.00, -.18]).
Figure 2. Response surface for (dis)similarities in the judgements of the victim’s hostility in trifling 
offense condition – relationships with self-assessment. The polynomial coefficients were as follows: 
b0 = 6.15, 95% confidence interval (CI) [5.92, 6.38]; b1 = -.05, 95% CI [-.26, .16]; b2 = -.59, 95% CI 
[-.96, -.22]; b3 = -.05, 95% CI [-.22, .13]; b4 = .01, 95% CI [-.17, .18]; b5 = -.30 [-.48, -.12].
Source: Authors’ own study.
Figure 2 (“Trifling” offense) presents more complex relationships. Firstly, it 
turned out that the bigger the discrepancy between hostility attributed to “my” and 
“not my” victim, the lower the intensity of self-assessment motive in the asses-
sor, i.e. the smaller his/her motivation to know the truth about himself/herself (a4 = 
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-.36; 95% [CI] = [-.63, -.08]). Secondly, self-assessment motive was higher in par-
ticipants who attributed higher hostility to their own victim and smaller hostility to 
someone else’s victim and, reversely, self-assessment motive was lower in partici-
pants who attributed higher hostility to someone else’s victim and lower hostility to 
their own victim (a3 = .54; 95% [CI] = [.14, .92]). Thirdly, participants who attrib-
uted lower hostility to both their own victim and someone else’s victim were higher 
in self-assessment, while participants who attributed higher hostility to both victims 
were significantly lower in self-assessment (a1 = -.64; 95% [CI] = [-1.10, -.18]). Last 
but not least, self-assessment motive was the strongest in participants who attributed 
medium hostility to both victims, slightly weaker (but still strong) in participants 
who attributed low hostility to both victims, and average in participants who attrib-
uted high hostility to both victims (a2 = -.35; 95% [CI] = [-.56, -.14]).
Unlike Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 depicts relationships between variables in 
“Severe” offense condition. According to the results, the bigger the discrepancy 
Figure 3. Response surface for (dis)similarities in the judgements of the victim’s hostility in severe 
offense condition – relationships with self-esteem. The polynomial coefficients were as follows: b0 = 
27.96, 95% confidence interval (CI) [26.42, 29.50]; b1 = -.37, 95% CI [-2.25, 1.50]; b2 = -.43, 95% CI 
[-2.50, 1.64]; b3 = -1.43, 95% CI [-2.54, -0.32]; b4 = 2.43, 95% CI [0.29, 4.57]; b5 = -1.02 [-2.24, .20].
Source: Authors’ own study.
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between the levels of hostility attributed to “my” and “not my” victim (regardless 
of which victim was attributed to higher, and which victim to lower hostility), the 
lower level of self-esteem in the assessor. In other words, the higher self-esteem of 
the assessor, the bigger congruence of the hostility levels attributed to his/her own 
victim and someone else’s victim (a4 = -4.89; 95% [CI] = [-8.84, -.92]).
DISCUSSION
The first research question (Q1) concerned the impact of the severity of the 
offense on the judgement of the victim’s hostility and sadness. It was postulated 
(H1) that the judgements would be higher for severe offense and lower for trifling 
offense. Based on the results, the judgement of the victim’s hostility does not de-
pend on the severity of the offense, while the judgement of the victim’s sadness 
does depend (sadness was judged as more intensely experienced by the victims of 
severe offense, as compared to the victims of trifling offense). This means that H1 
was confirmed for sadness but not for hostility. This may be because of the nature 
of situations described in the short-stories presented to the participants (go back 
to Table 1 for the details). Perhaps hostility towards the perpetrator is an emotion 
equally suitable to the situations of a serious health damage and a pilfering, irre-
spective of in which of these situations this emotion appears faster and in which 
later and how long it lasts. Sadness, on the other hand, may suit better to a long-
lasting suffering than to a single episodic theft of low financial loss. Although H1 
has not been fully confirmed, logically explainable mean values of hostility and 
sadness in the conditions of severe and trifling offenses speak for the validity of 
their measurements.
The second research question (Q2) concerned the impact of the identity (i.e. 
me/not me) of the perpetrator on his/her judgement of the victim’s negative emo-
tions (i.e. hostility and sadness) in both offense conditions (i.e. severe and tri-
fling). Despite one exception (judgments of sadness in trifling offense condition), 
participants judged higher sadness and hostility of their own victim as compared 
to someone else’s victim, which means that, in general, H2 postulating that people 
would attribute lower negative emotional states to their own victim than to some-
one else’s victim was refuted. According to the findings, involvement of the self in 
the imagined offense in the role of the perpetrator indeed changes one’s perspec-
tive when judging the victim’s emotional states, however it looks like that in this 
particular case it is rather not due to self-enhancement motive. One possible ex-
planation is that perhaps the judgements of the victim’s emotional states are in fact 
the mirrors of the judge’s own emotional reactions to the short-stories presented 
to them. Judges imagining themselves as behaving in an irresponsible way which 
was harmful to other people (especially if it concerned a serious health damage) 
could experience feelings of guilt, self-blame and fear caused by the expected le-
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gal and social consequences of the offense. Therefore, their own negative affect 
could be to some extent transferred to their own (but not someone else’s) victim. 
On the contrary, a minor theft of bars and rolls (trifling offense condition) could 
probably be seen as more cunning than harmful to another person, allowing the 
activation of self-enhancement motive when judging sadness of one’s own victim 
and someone else’s victim. 
More nuanced and complex patterns of relationships between the variables 
were revealed in the response surface analyses. All significant models concerned 
the judgements of hostility. As regards trifling offense condition, (mis)matches of 
judgements were related to self-enhancement and self-assessment motives. What 
is interesting, there were two types of people high in self-enhancement: (1) these 
attributing low hostility to both their own victim and someone else’s victim and 
(2) those attributing high hostility to their own victim and low hostility to some-
one else’s victim (Figure 1). When considering the first type of self-enhancing 
participants, it is worth to look at the order of the tasks. The participants were first 
judging hostility of someone else’s victim and after that they were judging hos-
tility of their own victim. If they considered the situation of a minor theft as not 
very harmful by nature, they first attributed low hostility to the victim of someone 
else’s theft. Afterwards, being asked to imagine themselves committing analogous 
misdemeanor, the only thing they could do was attribute low hostility to their own 
victim as well. Perhaps due to strong self-enhancement motive they had the urge 
to attribute even lower level of hostility to their own victim, but it was impossi-
ble since they had already marked the lowest scale values when judging someone 
else’s victim. If so, they wanted, at least, to protect themselves (Alicke, Sedikides, 
2009) by maintaining equally positive self-view as the view of someone else com-
mitting similar offense (just to avoid being “the worse”). Why, however, some 
people high in self-enhancement attributed high hostility to their own victim and 
low hostility to someone else’s victim? Intuitively, they should do the opposite to 
play down negative outcomes of their own immoral behavior. However, stealing 
several bars or rolls is not a heavy crime, so predicting high hostility of any victim 
of such a theft seems quite unreasonable. Therefore, the emerging question is: is 
being a stealer of rolls actually threatening for the self-concept of a self-enhanc-
ing person? Perhaps, leaving the bakery with stolen rolls without being caught 
may bring a feeling of “wild satisfaction”, especially if the victim of such “inno-
cent” theft is seriously annoyed and feels higher hostility towards the perpetrator. 
In other words, the results suggest that minor immoral acts may be a means of 
self-promotion, i.e. they may play up positive attributes of a self-enhancing per-
son (“I did it! I am so cunning!”). Surprisingly, however, the participants low in 
self-enhancement attributed low hostility to their own victim and high hostility to 
someone else’s victim. This finding is quite difficult to explain. It should be noted 
that in general it is not common to have low level of self-enhancement, which 
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has proved to be a cardinal, strong self-motive of the majority of people (Dufner, 
Gebauer, Sedikides, Denissen, 2019). Very low level of self-enhancement may be 
indicative for the people self-verifying negative self-views, as well as for the in-
dividuals suffering from depression (Alloy, Wagner, Black, Gerstein, Abramson, 
2011). Such people, however, should rather attribute higher hostility to their own 
victim (thereby increasing the seriousness of their offense) in order to maintain 
their self-concept of being a “bad” person, but in this study was it was the other 
way round. Perhaps this unexpected result may be explained the nature of the 
items used to measure self-enhancement in this study (i.e. “In general, I LIKE to 
hear that I am a GREAT person” and “In general, I WANT to discover that I have 
EXCELLENT qualities”). It is possible that such items may cause defensive reac-
tions in people who are modest (or want to be considered modest because of the 
need for social approval). On the other hand, people who actually love to listen to 
superlatives about themselves may want to disguise such inglorious inclination, so 
as not to be accused of being a buffoon. This would mean that among people with 
low results in self-enhancement measured by the Self-Motive Items SMI (Gregg, 
Hepper, Sedikides, 2011) there could be people with medium or even high levels 
of self-enhancement. This issue requires a future in-depth examination in a spe-
cially designed research since it questions the validity of measurement of self-
enhancement motive via the SMI. 
Self-assessment motive was another predictor of (in)convergence between the 
judgements of victims’ hostility in trifling offense condition. It must be underlined 
that self-assessment had negative skewed distribution in this research sample and 
therefore response surface analysis could not provide data about the answers pro-
vided by people low in this motive (see Figure 2). According to the results, the urge 
to know the truth about one’s self was the strongest in respondents who attributed 
medium hostility to both their own victim and someone else’s victim, still strong in 
respondents who attributed low hostility to both victims and medium in respondents 
who attributed high hostility to both victims. These findings are easy to understand 
if we realize that people may differently perceive the harmfulness of a minor theft. 
Some of participants could think that stealing several low-cost bars or rolls does 
not threaten economic status of the victim and therefore it should not trigger his/
her hostility towards the stealer. Other respondents could notice, however, that even 
a minor theft may be annoying for the lossy victim and, therefore, some dose of 
hostility (i.e. medium or even high) towards the thief is quite probable. This or that 
perception of a minor theft may depend on the person’s cognitive skills, for example 
on the level of integrative complexity, i.e. the ability to see different points of view 
and combine them into the understandable whole (Suedfeld, Tetlock, 1977; Brod-
beck, Kugler, Fischer, Heinze, Fischer, 2020). Anyway, the point is that in this study 
a high level of self-assessment was related to equal standards when judging hostility 
of one’s own victim and someone else’s victim. In turn, double standards were asso-
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ciated with lower level of self-assessment, especially if respondent attributed higher 
hostility to someone else’s victim than to his/her own victim. These findings may be 
considered as another proof that people high in self-assessment actually look for the 
truthful information (Gregg, Hepper, Sedikides, 2011). The results also showed that 
some participants high in self-assessment attributed higher hostility to their own vic-
tim as compared to someone else’s victim. Perhaps this result refers to the restrictive 
side of self-assessment, i.e. a person who wants to be truthful in perceiving oneself 
may expect more good and morality from oneself, and therefore has a tendency to 
perceive the consequences of his/her own negative behaviors as much more serious 
than negative consequences of analogous deeds of other people. What is more im-
portant, self-assessment motive was lower in participants who judged higher hostil-
ity in someone else’s victim and lower in their own victim. It is worth recalling that 
identical pattern of double standards was related to high self-enhancement, which 
advocates the inter-consistency of the results. 
As regards severe offense condition, it was not self-motives but self-esteem 
that proved to be useful in explaining equal and double standards in judging the 
hostility of one’s own victim and someone else’s victim. Perhaps this was due to 
the fact that attempting to deny the negative consequences of such a severe offense 
as causing permanent physical disability to another person is associated with more 
solid foundations in personality, as compared to self-motives being triggered and 
changeable due to various situational stimuli (self-esteem, in contrast to self-en-
hancement and self-assessment motives, has a solid grounding in personality, both 
innate and learned (Harter, 1993). As Figure 3 shows, participants having low self-
esteem used double standards in their judgements, regardless of whose hostility was 
judged higher and whose hostility was judged lower. Higher hostility attributed to 
one’s own victim of severe offense may be a direct consequence of low self-esteem 
(“I did something really wrong, I am a bad person!”) whilst lower hostility attrib-
uted to one’s own victim may be the example of defensive self-esteem strengthen-
ing (compare: Haddock, Gebauer, 2011). Most importantly, high self-esteem of the 
judge was related to equal standards in judging hostility of both victims.
To sum up, equal and double standards in judging hostility in one’s own and 
someone else’s victims were predicted by one’s self-enhancement and self-assess-
ment in trifling offense condition and by one’s self-esteem in severe offense con-
dition. In turn, (in)congruence between the judgements of victims’ sadness was 
not significantly related to any aspects of the self investigated in this study. Per-
haps sadness, appearing to a greater or lesser extent among victims of trifling and 
severe offenses, is something so obvious that people can assess it regardless of 
how much motivated they are to learn the truth about themselves, and at the same 
time, sadness is presumably something not threatening (or rewarding!) enough 
to affect positive self-image of the self-enhancing perpetrator. Attention must be 
paid to the low reliability of one of the measurements of sadness (go back to Ta-
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ble 2) which may partly explain (mis)matches in sadness having no significant 
relationships aspects of the self in “Severe” offense condition. Another limitation 
of the study concerns the instruction to imagine being a perpetrator of the offense 
described in a short-story. It as in fact a mild form of experimental manipulation 
which could not work for some (less vulnerable) participants. To our knowledge, 
our study was so far the first in which the response surface analysis has been used 
in order to determine predictors of equal and double standards in judging emo-
tional consequences in victims suffering from major and minor offenses. Before 
generalizing the results, this study requires replication with the use of improved 
operationalizations of the variables. Most of all, non-self-report measures of self-
motives are highly recommended.
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STRESZCZENIE
Rola emocji w ludzkiej moralności jest podkreślana przez wielu neuronaukowców i filozofów. 
Z psychologicznego punktu widzenia rozwiązywanie dylematów moralnych jest niemożliwe w ode-
rwaniu od procesów poznawczo-emocjonalnych związanych z Ja. Niniejsze badanie miało na celu 
przetestowanie czynników związanych z Ja, potencjalnie wyjaśniających rozbieżności w zakresie 
szacowanych poziomów wrogości i smutku doświadczanych przez ofiary poważnych przestępstw 
i drobnych wykroczeń, w których wyobrażonym sprawcą była osoba dokonująca szacowania lub 
jakaś inna osoba. Badanie przeprowadzono w paradygmatach eksperymentalnym i korelacyjnym, 
przy czym kluczową metodą analizy danych była analiza powierzchni odpowiedzi (RSA). Przeba-
dano 171 osób za pomocą takich kwestionariuszy, jak: Skala Motywów Autoewaluacyjnych (SMA), 
Skala Samooceny Rosenberga (SES), Polska Adaptacja testu Ten Items Personality Inventory (TIPI-
PL) oraz Skala Pozytywnego i Negatywnego Afektu – Wersja Rozszerzona (PANAS-X). Okazało 
się, że samoocena była predyktorem (nie)zgodności poziomów wrogości przypisywanych ofiarom 
poważnych przestępstw, podczas gdy motywy autowaloryzacji i samopoznania przewidywały okre-
ślone wzorce (ro)zbieżności poziomów wrogości przypisywanych ofiarom drobnych wykroczeń. 
Dyskusja wyników dotyczy m.in. znaczenia perspektywy Ja dla skutecznego rozpoznawania stanów 
emocjonalnych innych ludzi.
Słowa kluczowe: wrogość; ofiara; autowaloryzacja; samoocena; analiza powierzchni odpowiedzi
